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LYNDA L. BUTLER

Defining Public Consumptive Rights
in Virginia's Rivers, Streams, and Lakes:
Is Legislative Reform Needed?
D URING the seven-year period from 1977 through
1983, Virginia experienced three severe droughts that
caused millions of dollars in damages_ 1 Perhaps the
most serious of the droughts occurred in 1983, when
drought conditions persisted for months in eighty-two
out of the state's ninety-five counties_ During that
summer most areas of the state received less than
half the normal rainfall. By the end of the 1983 harvest season, the drought had caused an estimated
$200 million in damages to the state's crops.2
Agricultural users were not the only ones detrimentally affected by the droughts. Many Virginia localities faced weeks of dangerously low water supplies.
Drought conditions in 1980, for instance, decreased
the groundwater table by as much as four feet in some
areas and caused water reservoir levels to fall significantly.3 The 1980 drought was so severe in southeastern Virginia that the Governor proclaimed a water
resource emergency for the area. 4 Several localities
imposed mandatory water use restrictions,5 while the
limited water supplies of two localities prompted them
to adopt water rationing plans. 6
Although the actual drought conditions have now
abated, the droughts continue to have an impact in
Virginia. One of their most important consequences is
that they have focused attention on the degree to
which Virginia law adequately provides for the consumptive needs of the public. Because of rapid population growth in several of Virginia's water-poor
areas, interest in this issue should remain strong until
the water supply problems of those areas are alleviated.7 This article will examine the nature of public
consumptive rights in Virginia's rivers, streams, and
lakes. It will begin by discussing the legal principles
presently governing use of Virginia's watercourses.
Then, after evaluating how well those principles
accommodate the public interest, it will briefly discuss several proposed legislative reforms to determine
whether they provide a more acceptable accommodation.
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An Introduction to the Riparian Doctrine
Most of the legal rules governing consumptive use
of Virginia's rivers, streams, and lakes are from the
common law. Although the General Assembly has
enacted some statutory modifications, the vast majority of these amendments supplement the common law
rather than replace it. 8 Under Virginia's common law
each water resource is classified according to its place
in the earth's ''hydrologic,'' or water circulation, cycle
and separate legal rules are developed for the major
classifications. Those principles governing use of
natural watercourses, one of the main classifications,
collectively are known as the riparian doctrine. The
basic tenet of that doctrine is that a party owning
land abutting a watercourse has the right to make
reasonable uses of the watercourse for the benefit of
his riparian land .9 Because these use rights arise as
incidents to ownership of land bordering the watercourse, they generally are considered to be vested
property rights lO which cannot be impaired arbitrarily or taken without just compensation by the state. I I
Under the riparian doctrine two key principles
define and limit consumptive interests in Virginia's
watercourses. First, a riparian proprietor can exercise
his rights only for the benefit of riparian land.
Second, the riparian's use must be reasonable. Developed in an era when most riparians were private parties, these two principles reflect assumptions and policies that limit their ability to accommodate the
public's consumptive needs.

The Riparian Land Limitation: Restricting the Area
to be Benefitted
The riparian land limitation serves an important
function under Virginia law: it restricts the area that
can benefit from use of surface waters and thus offers
some protection for present users. To qualify as riparian land, a tract naturally must have physical contact
with a watercourse. Because this standard, though ,
fails to indicate how much land is riparian, the courts

have developed several other tests for identifying
riparian land.
One additional standard applied by the Virginia
courts is the watershed test. Under this standard land
must be within the watershed, or natural drainage
area, of a watercourse to qualify as riparian to that
watercourse. 12 As explained by one court, this limitation ensures that any water withdrawn, but not fully
used, by one riparian will remain in the watershed
and thus be able to return to the watercourse for use
by other riparians in that watershed. 13
A further refinement to the definition of riparian
land provides that land not abutting a watercourse
must have been acquired in the same transaction as
the portion touching the watercourse to qualify as
riparian land. 14 The courts apparently developed this
limitation to prevent abuse by riparian owners.
Because this qualification restricts riparian status to
land acquired in a single transaction, a riparian proprietor cannot enlarge his tract of riparian land by
purchasing land contiguous to his original tract of
riparian land but not contiguous to the watercourse. I S
Although the restriction thus achieves a more equitable distribution of consumptive rights, it limits the
area within the watershed that can be benefitted. For
a riparian locality steadily growing in size, this limitation can have serious consequences.
A final qualification developed by the Virginia
courts restricts riparian status to tracts that are unitary in a physical sense, as defined by reasonable
community standards and location in the watershed. 16
This limitation helps to define the priority status of
riparians and to ensure that an unreasonable burden
is not imposed on them. For instance, under the unitary tract standard, a party owning a tract consisting
of two main sections connected by a thin strip could
not claim that the lower section should receive the
same priority of use as the upper section. I ? Also, if the
unitary tract requirement were not imposed, a riparian landowner would have to review periodically the
deeds of his neighbors to protect his riparian rights
from fraudulent conveyances that had included his
land within the boundaries of neighboring land.

The Reasonable Us e Limitation: Imposing Quantitati ve Limits to Resolve Conflicts
The reasonable use limitation also serves an
important function under Virginia's riparian doctrine: it defines the quantitative use rights of each
riparian and thus provides a standard for resolving
conflicts among users. Whether a use is reasonable
depends on the facts and circumstances of a particular situation. Factors affecting the reasonableness of
a use include the normal conditions of a watercourse
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(such as size and flow), the purpose of the use, the
compatibility of the use with other uses, and the status of the user as an upper or lower riparian. 18
Although the importance of a use is not determinative, domestic uses such as drinking, bathing, cooking, and watering livestock tend to receive a higher
priority. 19
The judicial preference for domestic uses suggests
that a riparian locality meeting the domestic needs of
its inhabitants would have priority over most other
users. In applying thp reasonable use standard,
though, the Virginia courts have taken a narrow
perspective, defining the standard primarily in the
context of an individual private riparian. 20 This
approach may have been responsive to the demands
of riparians in the 1800's when many of them were
private persons who supplied their own consumptive
needs. Today, however, it fails to reflect modern water
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use patterns, primarily because local governments
have assumed responsibility for many of the domestic
uses previously conducted by private riparians. De·
spite this change in roles, the courts in Virginia and
many other riparian jurisdictions continue to define
the reasonable use restriction from their traditionally
narrow perspective and appear reluctant to broaden
the scope oftheir inquiry.

Public Consumptive Rights under
the Riparian Doctrine
The Virginia courts use the same riparian principles to define public consumptive rights as they do to
determine the nature and extent of private rights. As
explained above, many of these principles assume
that the user is a private party who is supplying most
of his needs. Although this assumption may have
been sensible when the riparian doctrine first developed, it seriously limits the water supply options of
localities attempting to satisfy their inhabitants'
needs.
To operate a public water supply system effectively,
local governments often need to divert water from a
river or lake and store it for future use. Under Virginia's traditional riparian principles, a riparian generally cannot divert water from a watercourse for use
beyond his riparian land. 2 1 No exception is made
where the riparian is a local government. A city or
town does not acquire greater rights just because of
its status as a governmental entity.22 Nor does it
acquire consumptive rights because of the location of
water resources within its boundaries . Although
jurisdiction over water resources may provide sufficient justification for regulating those resources, it
does not confer riparian rights upon a locality. 23
Thus, to be entitled to consumptive rights, a locality
generally must be a riparian proprietor.
Two principal explanations have been proffered by
the Virginia Supreme Court as justifications for its
no-diversion rule. The first is alluded to by the Court
in a 1942 decision where it describes a diversion to
nonriparian land as "an extraordinary and not a
reasonable use"24 and thus suggests that it views all
diversions to nonriparian land as per se unreasonable. This approach is not followed in most other riparian jurisdictions, which appear unwilling to declare a
diversion to be unreasonable without looking at the
surrounding facts and circumstances. 25
The second , suggested by a 1921 Virginia Supreme
Court decision, is that use of diverted water beyond a
riparian's tract of land violates the riparian land restriction. 26 This rationale poses a more serious obstacle to localities attempting to create public water supplies. Most diversions for public use would require
16

transfers to nonriparian land, often to areas in
another part of the watershed and sometimes to areas
outside the watershed. Yet, to be theoretically consistent, the courts must prohibit diversions that directly
conflict with the key definitions of riparian land. As
long as the riparian land requirement remains an
essential part of the riparian doctrine , substantial
violations of the requirement must be unlawful. Any
other approach would seriously undermine the policies being furthered by the riparian land restriction.
Even under Virginia's traditional riparian principles, several exceptions to the no-diversion rule exist.
Two exceptions based on related theories, the actual
injury requirement and the surplus water doctrine,
could enable localities to divert significant quantities
of water. The first exception, using the actual injury
requirement, arises because Virginia law requires a
riparian to establish injury before it can obtain relief
for an unlawful use.27 Although there is some confusion among the Virginia courts about the meaning of
injury,28 economic and equitable policy considerations support this exception. As long as the diversion for public use involves a reasonable share of
water and does not interfere with other riparians'
reasonable use rights, they should not have reason to
complain about the unfair effects of the diversion. Furthermore, allowing such diversions would increase
the number of people benefitting from the watercourse at minimal cost to other riparians and would
reduce the percentage of water in the watercourse not
being used.
The second exception , based on the surplus water
doctrine, focuses on whether a diversion involves
excess or surplus water. If a locality is diverting surplus water-that is, water in excess of the natural
flow of the watercourse-then the locality could argue
that its conduct is not interfering with the rights of
other riparians. A riparian generally is entitled to
receive only the natural flow of a stream after reasonable use by upper riparians.29 Once again, although
Virginia has given conflicting signals about the
validity of the surplus water doctrine,ao an exception
based on it can be justified for the same policy reasons as the first exception.
Even if the surplus water or actual injury exceptions are accepted in Virginia, they do not provide
permanent solutions to a locality's water supply problems. By definition, diversions based on these exceptions can continue without legal repercussion only as
long as surplus water exists or injury does not occur.
Furthermore, a locality conducting diversions under
either exception probably could not seek judicial protection of its uses against unlawful conduct by others.
Both theories permit the diversions because other

riparians cannot sue, and not because the diverter
has acquired a legally protected riparian right.
If a locality desires a more permanent, but generally more costly, solution to its water supply problems, it can pursue several other exceptions to the
no-diversion rule. For instance, as the Virginia Supreme Court recognized, a locality could acquire the
necessary rights and interests entitling it to divert by
pre cription, purchase, or condemnation. 3l Acquisition by prescription, though, requires long, continuous, wrongful use, while acquisition by purchase or
condemnation is feasible only if a locality has sufficient financial resources and purchasing powers to
acquire the necessary interests.32
If a watercourse is navigable, a locality also may
attempt to justify a diversion for public use by relying
on another important common law doctrine known as
the public trust doctrine. Developed to a significant
extent by the United States Supreme Court, this doctrine is based on the principle that a state holds certain resources, principally navigable waters and the
bed underneath them, in trust for its citizens. 3s
Although the doctrine has enabled governments in
other jurisdictions to make consumptive uses of
watercourses not otherwise permitted by the riparian
doctrine,34it probably will not help local governments
in Virginia. Given the state Supreme Court's reluctance to recognize the doctrine as authorizing even
more traditional public uses,35 it is unlikely that the
Court will extend the doctrine to consumptive uses of
navigable watercourses.
Proposed Legislative Reforms
In recent years the General Assembly has considered, but not enacted, several different legislative
proposals to reform Virginia's water law. Perhaps the
most significant of these proposals is the Virginia
Water Law Bill, which calls for comprehensive revision of the riparian doctrine. Introduced as a bill in
1981, the comprehensive proposal seeks to establish a
permit system to regulate consumptive use of Virginia's surface and ground waters.3S Under the bill's proposed permit system, any person making a "withdrawal, diversion, impoundment, or consumptive use"
of regulated waters must obtain a permit to do so,
unless the use does not exceed 5,000 gallons per day.3?
Nonregulated waters include "coastal waters,"38 or
"waters of the Atlantic Ocean and the Chesapeake
Bay within the jurisdiction of the state."39 Unless
otherwise exempted, existing users must obtain a
permit from the agency administering the system to
continue their use.40 However, those existing users
that apply should receive a permit automatically as
long as their uses qualify as reasonable-beneficial

uses. 4l Where an existing user is denied a permit, the
agency must award reasonable compensation. 42
In evaluating permit requests, the agency administering the system would have to grant a permit to an
applicant, generally for ten years, unless it found that
the proposed use was not a reasonable-beneficial use,
interfered with existing legal uses, or was inconsistent with state water planning or policy objectives:13
As a condition of the permit, however, the agency
may require the permittee to preserve certain minimum flOWS. 44 Also, like the permit systems adopted
in other jurisdictions, the Virginia Water Law Bill
would allow the regulatory agency to authorize diversion of surface or ground waters by the holder of a use
permit, provided that the agency determined that the
diversion was "consistent with the public interest."45
Several less ambitious reform measures also were
introduced in the General Assembly in 1981 and 1982.
Based on the premise that Virginia's riparian doctrine probably does not permit diversions, these measures attempt to eliminate or clarify those aspects of
the riparian doctrine that restrict or impede diversion
to nonriparian land. One bill, for example, seeks to
minimize the possibility that a riparian would try to
enjoin a diversion even though the use was "harmless." It provides that any "beneficial use of state
waters is lawful as against any person unless such
use causes harm to such person."46 "Harm" is defined
as existing where there is interference with valid
existing uses or a reduction in market value of riparian land. 4? The bill also clarifies that a use is not
unlawful just because it benefits nonriparian land or
is conducted by a local government, but rather is to be
evaluated on the basis of its reasonableness. 48 Criteria to be considered in making this evaluation include
"the social utility of the proposed nonriparian use,"
the existence of "practicable alternative sources" of
water, the degree to which the proposed use impacts
on other water uses such as maintenance of in-stream
flows for preservation of fish and wildlife, and the
social utility of other uses that would be adversely
affected by the proposed use. 49
Another partial reform bill deals with the diversion
issue more directly, affirmatively authorizing the
issuance of permits for diversions from one watershed
to another found to be "in the public interest."50 Factors to be considered in making this finding include
the effect of the transfer on such existing and future
uses as recreational, private, public, industrial, and
water quality uses, the "beneficial impact" ofthe proposed transfer on the state and its cities and counties,
the applicant's ability to "implement effectively its
responsibilities under the requested permit," and the
extent to which the proposed transfer affects the
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rights of other states to use the waters of the affected
stream. 5 1 More comprehensive than the "harmless
use" proposal, this bill also requires a permittee to
meet certain requirements after a permit is issued,
including the payment of user fees and the observance of specified minimum flows or levels.52 Significantly, forty percent of the compensation paid by the
permittee is to be disbursed to the jurisdiction where
the intake structure and appurtenant conduits are
located, while the remaining sixty percent is to be
divided among the regulatory agency and the localities adjoining the situs jurisdiction. 53
Both the comprehensive and partial reform measures have caused considerable controversy. The
comprehensive proposal, for instance, has been criticized because it would alter, and perhaps even take
away, the use rights of present riparians. 5 4 Also,
besides requiring substantial revenues to implement
the new permit system , the comprehensive bill would
place all regulatory power at the state level. Although
the bill authorizes the state regulatory agency to
a ppoint local advisory boards, this power is discretionary.f>5 In a state with a long tradition oflocal rule,
s uch a centralized approach understandably raises
misgivings among local governments.
If the goal of reform is to facilitate creation and
expansion of public water supplies by allowing diversions and other public consumptive uses, then the
partia l reform proposals seem to achieve this goal just
a s well as the comprehensive bill at far less cost. The
partial reform measures, though, have one serious
disadvantage. Because the primary goal of these proposals is to facilitate diversions within the general
framework of the riparian doctrine, they generally do
not impose sufficient limitations on the diversions to
protect the interests of water-rich jurisdictions. The
harmless use proposal, in particular, attempts to
allow diversions with as little disruption to the common law as possible. By failing to provide specific
protections for water-rich localities, it fails to recognize the important equitable concerns of water-rich
jurisdictions.56 These jurisdictions, many of which
are low-density rural areas, understandably fear that
water-poor areas will rob them of important development opportunities by attempting to divert some of
their abundant water resources. The anger and sense
of injustice felt by the water-rich jurisdictions is
intensified by a belief held by many ofthem that they
own the waters within their boundaries, or at least
have the right to use the resources for the benefit of
their inhabitants. Although this belief is not legally
justified,57 it does seem to reflect a legitimate concern:
a fair distribution of resources would seem to require
giving a water-rich jurisdiction some priority over
18

other jurisdictions in using resources within its
boundaries.
The common law approach certainly provides for
this concern better than the proposed reforms. As
previously explained, under the common law a waterpoor jurisdiction generally cannot divert water from a
water-rich area. The common law approach, however,
fails to recognize the competing concerns and interests at stake. By prohibiting diversion of watercourses for public use, Virginia's riparian doctrine
seriously limits the options of water-poor localities.
Because this situation exists in a state generally rich
in water resources, it leads to frustration and resentment among localities searching for water. Jurisdictions poor in water resources are forced to bargain
with parties willing to sell surplus water, often on
unfavorable terms, or resort to their own diversion
plans. Because these self-help schemes typically involve the diversion and transfer of water from one
watershed to another, challenges from private riparians and water-rich areas affected by the plans are
likely to result. 58
If the self-help scheme involves acquisition of the
right to divert by purchase and condemnation, then it
may survive a challenge. The courts generally permit
agreements that purchase, restrict, or alter riparian
rights 59 and, where voluntary transactions are not
feasible, localities with sufficient eminent domain
powers can condemn the property interests affected
by the plan.60 Not all water-poor localities, though ,
could afford to pursue this option .
Where, however, the self-help scheme relies on possible exceptions to Virginia's no-diversion rule instead
of acquisition of necessary interests by purchase or
condemnation, then it could survive a challenge only
if the Virginia courts were willing to recognize the
need to modernize the riparian doctrine, interpret the
exceptions broadly, and assume an active role in
defining public consumptive interests. Even then
unrestrained diversions probably would not be allowed
under the riparian doctrine because of conflicts with
key principles, unless the courts chose to rely on the
public trust doctrine to justify the diversion plan.
Given the propensity of the Virginia judiciary to follow precedent and apply traditionally accepted legal
principles, it is highly unlikely that such a situation
would occur. Legislative reform thus would seem to be
the only viable alternative for protecting and providing for the public's consumptive interests in Virginia's watercourses. To be politically acceptable, though,
a proposal would have to achieve a better balance
between the competing interests and policy concerns
than that reflected in the reforms proposed so far .

F OOTNOTES

This article summarizes, and relates to Virginia, portions of
another more comprehensive article entitled "Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining the
Relationship Between Public and Private Interests" (currently
unpublished manuscript available at Marshall-Wythe School of
La w, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia)_
1. See generally State Water Study Comm'n, Report to the
Governor and the Genera l Assembly of Virginia, S. Doc. No. 15,
at 5-6 (19 1) (describing 1980 drought); State Wa ter Study
Comm'n, Interim Report to the Governor and the General
Assembly of Virginia, . Doc. No. 21 , at 5 (1979) (describing
1977 drought); Va. Water Resources Research Center, 14 Wat er
N ews, No. 10, at 1-2 (Oct. 1983) (describing 1983 drought) (hereinafter cited a Water N ews ]; id., No.9, at 1-2 (Sept. 1983) (describing 1983 drought).
2. 14 Water N ews, supra note 1, No. 10, at 1 (Oct. 1983). More
. specifically, the 1983 drought caused an estimated $13 million
10 s in sales to the state's potato and commercial vegetable
farmers, $30 million in corn sales, $25 million in soybean sales,
and $20 million in tobacco sales. Id. , No. 9, at 1 (Sept. 1983).
During the 1980 and 1977 droughts, Virginia sustained crop
los es totaHng $232 million and $292 million, re pectively. Id.,
No. 10, at 1 (Oct. 1983).
3. See M. Hrezo, Norfolk v. Suffolk: Proposed Agreement
Leaves Important Iss ues Unsettled 1 01a. Water Resources
Research Center, Special Report No. 14, Nov. 1981}. See generally U.S. Geological Survey, Dept. of the Interior, Water-Data
Report VA -8 I-I, Water R esources Data: Virginia Water Year
1981 (1982).
4. Gov. of Va., Emergency Executive Order No. 45 (SO) (Oct.
22, 19 0).
5. E.g., Ches apeake, Va., Ordinance No. 80-0-0188 (Aug.
19,19 0); Portsmouth, Va., Ordinance No. 1980-67 (Aug. 12,
19 0).
6. orfolk, Va., Ordinance 0. 30, 737 (Ju\. 25, 1980); Virginia Beach, Va., An Ordina nce to amend Section 37-11(b) of the
Code of the ity of Virginia Beach, Virginia (Oct. 13, 1980).
7. The City of Virginia Beach , for instance, has experienced
a 52% increase in population within the last ten years and now
has a bout 6% of the state's population , yet does not have a
substantial source of fresh surface water within its boundaries.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dept. of Commerce, 1980 Census of
Population, Characteristics of the Population - Numb er of Inhabitants, U.S. Summary 1-43, 1-177.
8. But see Ground Wa ter Act, Va. Code §§ 62.1-44.83 to
-44.107 (Rep\. Vo\. 1982).
9. See Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 467,
130 S.E. 40 ,410 (1925). ee g en erally 2 H. Farnham, The Law
of Waters and Water Rights § 465 (1904). Although the doctrine
of li ttoral rights, and not the riparian doctrine, technically governs consumptive uses of lakes, the principles of the littoral
rights doctrine are virtually identical to those of the riparia n
doctrine. ee 6A American Law of Property §28. 55 (A. Casner
ed.1954).
10. ee Hite v. Luray, 175 Va. 218, 226, 8 S.E.2d 369, 372
(1940).
11. ee Grinels v. Daniel, 110 Va. 874 , 877, 67 .E. 534, 536
(1910). The rights of a riparian are not absolute, though, for
other riparian landowners along the same watercourse also
have a correlative a nd equal right to make a reasonable use of
the watercourse_ Hit v. Luray, 175 Va. 218, 225, 8 .E.2d 369,
371 , 372 (1940).
12. See, e.g ., Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 551, 106 S.E.
508,511 (1921).

13. Id. at 552, 106 S.E. at 511 (quoting explanation of Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907) .
14. Although the Virginia Supreme Court has not expressly
adopted the single transaction standard, it has discussed the
standard in favorable terms. See Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va.
542, 553,555-57, 106 S.E. 50 ,512-13 (1921).
15. See generally 2 H. Farnham, supra note 9, § 463(a).
16. See Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542,106 .E. 50 (1921).
17. In GordonslJille IJ. Zinn, id., a conflict developed between
the tow~ of Gordonsville, which owned a one-acre lot abutting a
nonnavIgable stream, and an individual riparian landowner,
who had separately purchased two tracts ofland, located above
and below the town's lot and connected by a strip of land. The
land above the town's lot was approximately 25 feet in width
and abutted the stream. The town sought an injunction to prevent the individual landowner from withdrawing water from
the streams at a point located on her upper property and pumping it to her dwelling on the lower section.
In considering the status of the defendant's land, the Court
concluded that although the lower property was riparian to the
stream, it could at best be regarded as lower riparian land in
relation to the town's lot. As explained by the Court the lower
section was not within the watershed of the upper s~ction and
therefore could not be considered to be riparian to that part of
the stream abutted by the upper property. Thus, the Court
f~cus.ed on physical location within the watershed in defining
npanan status.
18. See Davis v. Harrisonburg, 116 Va. 864,869, 83 S.E. 401,
403 (1914); Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 13,
73 S.E. 459, 462 (1912).
19. ee Norfolk & Western Ry. Go. v. Graham Land &
Improvement Co., 10 Va. L. Reg. 983, 984 (Cir. Ct. 1904). Water
planning and policy provisions enacted in Virginia generally
r~affirm the common law preference for domestic uses, espeCIally human consumptive uses. See, e.g., Va. Code § 62.144.36(2) (Rep\. Vo\. 1982).
20. See, e.g., Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758, 765, 40
S.E.2d 298, 301 (1946) (pollution of stream by mine water held
not to be a reasonable use); Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514,
521, 19 S.E.2d 700, 703 (1942) (municipality diverting water for
the domestic use of its inhabitants found not to be making a
reasonable use).
. 21. Carpenter v. Gold, 88 Va. 551, 14 S.E. 329 (1892). A riparIan, however, may be able to divert a watercourse if he returns
the watercourse to its original channel before it leaves his land
and other riparians are not injured_ Cook v. Seaboard Airline
Ry., 107 Va. 32, 35, 57 S.E. 564,565 (1907).
22. See Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921).
23. Under recent statutory amendments, jurisdiction over
water resources also gives a local political subdivision the
power to approve or disapprove of various water projects proposed by another subdivision when the projects are to be located
within the boundaries of the locality having jurisdiction. See,
e.g. , Va. Code §§ 15.1-37, -332.1, -456, -875, -1250.1 (Rep\. Vol.
1981 & Supp. 1984).
24. Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 521, 19 S.E.2d 700, 703
(1942). Another rationale, also suggested by PurcellIJille, is that
a diversion by a local government for the purpose of creating a
pubHc water supply is an unreasonable use. ee id.
25. See, e.g., Elliot v. Fitchburg, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191, 193,
194 (1852); Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 A. 18, 19 (1892)'
Lawrie v. ilsby, 76 Vt. 240, 56 A. 1106, 1109 (1904).
'
26. Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 558-59,106 .E. 508 514
(1921).
'
27. See id. at 560, 106 S.E. at 514.
28. Compare Panther Coal v. Looney, 185 Va. 75 , 765, 40
S.E .2d 298, 301 (1946) (holding that only those interferences
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that "impart to the water s uch impurities as substantially
impair its value for the ordinary purposes of life, and render it
measurably unfit for domestic purposes" are actionable) with
Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 5 14, 524, 19 S.E.2d 700, 704 (1942)
(statin g th at "a diversion of a natural watercou rse, though
without actual dam age to a lower ripa ri a n owner, is an infringement of a legal ri ght a nd imports damage").
29_ Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, 143 Va. 460, 46~67,
130 S.E. 408, 410 (1 925)_ But see Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va.
542, 558, 106 S.E. 508, 514 (1921) (s uggesti ng that Virgini a
might follow the more restrictive English version, which gives
riparians th e right to the normal flow of a stream, undiminished
by nonriparian uses regardless of how reason able).
30. Compare Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 562, 106 S.E.
508,515 (1921) (apparently recognizin g the doctrine) wilh 19711972 Op. of the Att'y Gen_ of Va. 80 (1972) (dismissing the doctrine as questionable).
31. Gordonsvill e v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 563, 106 S.E. 508, 515
(1921)_
32. Acquiring the right to divert would involve purchasing or
condemning the flow and reasonable use rights of all riparian s
below the point of diversion who would sustain injury because
of the diversi on . lfinjury is defined broadly to include potential
harm, th ese acquisitions could be costly. It a lso would require
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use. S ee supra note 43.
55. The Virginia Water Law, H.B. 14 20, 198 1 Va. Gen.
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The prospect of a ch ange in the common la w rules governing
consumptive use of watercourses also raises an important fairness concern among private users. A significant departure from
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